ABSTRACT: Despite the significant progress that the United States and the USSR have made in cooperating to resolve regional conflicts, many of these conflicts continue. One reason for this is that the Soviet and American governments have had differing expectations regarding what the outcome of superpower conflict resolution efforts should be. Yet even when Soviet and American aims are similar, there are other obstacles to conflict resolution. Among these are the lack of commitment to democracy on the part of one or more of the local antagonists in regional conflicts, and involvement by other external parties in the conflicts. There is no guarantee that the superpowers can successfully resolve regional conflicts even if they adopt a common approach to conflict resolution, but adopting a common approach may at least allow Washington and Moscow to unlink their overall relations from those conflicts that cannot be resolved.
T HE present era of Soviet-Ameri-
can relations is unique in that, unlike the Cold War period, both superpowers now see their interests as being better served through disengaging from and resolving regional conflicts. Yet, despite dramatic agreements to resolve some regional conflicts, fighting rages on in several parts of the Third World.
Can any lessons for the future be drawn from recent superpower efforts to resolve regional conflicts? Attempting to draw generalizable lessons from different cases is a difficult task. Each conflict is unique in terms of its causes and evolution. Each conflict is also unique in terms of the nature, strength, and motivations of both the local antagonists and their external supporters.
Since such a high degree of variability exists between different regional conflicts, the most obvious generalization that can be made about them is that there is no generalizable resolution formula applicable to them all. Another generalization that can be made is that a mutual desire on the part of the superpowers to resolve regional conflicts is not a sufficient condition to bring about their peaceful conclusion.
These two generalizations do not provide a hopeful basis for drawing lessons about superpower conflict resolution in the future. To assume that no lessons at all can be drawn from disparate cases, however, may lead us to overlook genuinely useful experience and to commit avoidable errors in the future.
One way to examine whether generalizable lessons for the future of superpower conflict resolution exist is to analyze the applicability of superpower expectations or models regarding conflict resolution as well as the applicability of successful instances of conflict resolution to other conflicts. For whether generalizable models of conflict resolution actually exist, it is clear that Soviet and American leaders have expectations-which, of course, are evolving-regarding what the outcome of superpower conflict resolution efforts should be. In addition, the successful or partially successful experience of conflict resolution efforts in one country or region raises the question of whether a similar solution is applicable more generally. What these expectations and experiences are, as well as their realism and general applicability, will be examined here.
BEFORE GORBACHEV: UNILATERALIST MODELS
Until the Gorbachev era, neither Soviet nor American leaders seriously envisioned superpower cooperation as a means of resolving Third World conflicts, especially insurgencies. Instead, each viewed these conflicts in zero-sum terms; a loss for one superpower was a gain for the other. The maximum goal was to help one's own allies achieve victory over the other's allies. The minimum goal was to prevent the other's allies from defeating one's own.
From the late 1940s, the model guiding American foreign policy was one of containment. This worked well with regard to strategic nuclear weapons and Europe. The USSR, Cuba, and Vietnam had sent large numbers of troops to protect weak Marxist regimes in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia. Because of the expense and the fruitlessness of their efforts, all three intervening states decided to withdraw their troops as part of a settlement process in these three countries.
In the United States, foreign policymakers expected that Communist troop withdrawals would lead to certain consequences. In its most optimistic form, the expectation of American policymakers was that the withdrawals would lead to the collapse of the Marxist regimes that these soldiers had previously defended. This expectation was based on the American experience in Indochina, where U.S. troop withdrawal was followed shortly by the overthrow of the regimes that Washington had previously supported in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This expectation was widely held with regard to the future of the Najibullah regime immediately after the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989.
These optimistic-from the American point of view-expectations have not been met so far. Are they likely to be? In other words, is the South Vietnam model a generalizable expectation with regard to conflict resolution now? The answer to both questions is, probably not.
There are three reasons why the South Vietnam model is probably not applicable now. First, with regard to Afghanistan, the opposition forces are not unified and their factional infighting has increased following the departure of Soviet troops-a phenomenon that only helps the Kabul regime.
Second, the Marxist regimes in all these countries enjoy some degree of internal support, partly because significant sectors of the population view the opposition groups as less desirable than the existing government. In Afghanistan, many fear that the overthrow of the Kabul regime will mean that the most extreme Islamic fundamentalist mujahidin groups will come to power. In Cambodia, the most powerful opposition group is the murderous Khmer Rouge, compared to which the Hun Sen regime's rule is far more benevolent. In Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is led by mesticoes and Mbundus; these groups prefer it to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which is dominated by the Ovimbundu. A dramatic regime change clearly took place in Nicaragua, but this is hardly an example of the applicability of the South Vietnam model. The regime change took place only after American funding to the contra rebels had been ended and the contras had virtually been driven out of the country. Further, the Sandinistas defeated the rebels without large numbers of foreign Communist troops participating in combat operations as in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia. If there is any lesson that can be drawn from Nicaragua, it may be that dramatic regime change is more likely to occur only after external as-sistance to the rebels and the rebel insurgency itself have effectively ended; this is a proposition that will be examined later.
If the South Vietnam model is to work, it would do so only if the United States and its allies beefed up their military support for rebel groups to the point where the latter could seize power. Such an achievement, however, seems highly unlikely. While a certain amount of aid is needed to assist a rebel group to avoid defeat, a much greater amount is probably necessary to enable it to seize power from a government still enjoying substantial external support. At present, it is doubtful that current levels of American support will be maintained, much less increased, to rebel groups in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia. In Cambodia, the United States ended its minimal support to the two non-Communist opposition groups for fear that this aid would ultimately serve to benefit only the Chinesebacked Khmer Rouge. Moscow experienced a similar situation once before, in North Yemen. For five years in the 1960s, Soviet combat pilots and advisers helped 60,000 Egyptian troops try to defend a republican regime against Saudibacked royalist rebels. The war proceeded miserably, and Egypt finally decided to withdraw in 1967. To encourage Egypt's withdrawal, Saudi Arabia agreed to end its aid to the royalists. Even so, the republican regime seemed on the point of defeat and was barely being kept alive by a last-ditch Soviet airlift when the royalist opposition literally fell apart. Two years later, an agreement was reached whereby the royalists, minus their top leadership, were granted amnesty and allowed to hold office in the existing republican regime. The orthodox Communist leaderships in each of these five countries also concluded that the use of force against the opposition was no longer permissible. Indeed, these orthodox Communists basically lost confidence in both their ability and their right to continue ruling. In all of these countries, opposition forces enjoyed enormous popular support, while the Communist regimes had almost none. In addition, the opposition forces in each of these countries were committed to democratization -they did not seek to install their own dictatorships. As part of this democratization process, opposition forces were willing to allow the former Communist rulers to retain their parties and compete in elections. For the Communists, losing power did not mean losing their lives as well. In fact, they retained the right to participate in politics.
Most of these conditions are not present in the Marxist nations of the Third World. In Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Ethiopia, the Marxist regimes are still prepared to use force against the opposition. In none of these countries is the opposition committed to democratization. For the Marxists in these countries, then, losing power could well mean losing their lives in addition to any meaningful right to participate in politics.
Perhaps In addition, the Sandinistas understood that, as in Eastern Europe, losing power did not.mean that they would lose their lives or be eliminated from politics. Indeed, the Sandinistas remain the largest single party in the National Assembly. If the UNO coalition of 14 parties breaks up, the Sandinistas will play a key role in the assembly. In addition, unlike the Communist parties of Eastern Europe, the Sandinistas appear to enjoy a credible chance of being reelected to power in the future.
One of the underlying prerequisites for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Nicaragua was that each side in the election agreed to respect the election results even if the other side won. They did not agree to this simply through idealism but because both sides understood that the electorate demanded it. This should not be surprising, though, considering that, unlike some other parts of the Third World, Latin America has increasingly valued republican democracy. With the exception of Cuba and Guyana, Latin American states either are democracies or are making significant progress toward democracy. Indeed, Latin America has had greater experience with democracy than Eastern Europe. It is highly doubtful, though, that Soviet-American cooperation in the gulf crisis can serve as a model for superpower collaboration in similarly extreme cases involving the complete conquest of one country by another. While the United States and the USSR would both oppose such conquest or attempted conquest, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet or the American government would consider its interests outside the gulf to be so threatened that either of them would be willing to commit its own armed forces to the task of liberating the conquered nation. Nor is it likely that Soviet or American public opinion would now tolerate protracted military intervention in any other part of the Third World. Probably the most that the two countries would be able to do in such a situation is to jointly isolate an aggressor and work to contain it from further expansion.
CONCLUSION
Can any lessons for the future be drawn from recent superpower efforts to resolve regional conflicts? The preceding analysis suggests that there may be relatively few. Nevertheless, there are some.
One lesson is that despite the progress in superpower conflict resolution that has been made so far, superpower diplomacy is unlikely to fully resolve conflicts if Washington and Moscow adhere to differing models of what the outcome of their conflict resolution efforts should be. It must be remembered that differences over the Third World played a large role in contributing to the breakdown of detente in the 1970s. Important differences over the outcome of conflict resolution could lead to both superpowers' remaining militarily involved in regional conflicts, the breakdown of their efforts to resolve conflicts, and negative consequences for detente.
Can these negative consequences of differing superpower expectations be avoided? They might be if the superpowers modified their expectations so that the other's interests were not threatened, or at least agreed on a common approach to conflict resolution. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
